offensive security · malware development · red teaming

z3vxo

I'm a security researcher working across web application security, malware development, and red team operations. I build offensive tooling, break access control, and document what I find.

What I do

Offensive security across the web layer, the endpoint, and the infrastructure behind it.

01

Web Security

Testing authentication, access control and business logic across modern web apps and APIs. Focused on IDOR, broken access control and credential exposure.

02

Malware Development

Building offensive tooling from the ground up — C2 frameworks, loaders and Windows internals for red team engagements.

03

Red Teaming

Adversary simulation from initial access through post-exploitation, including redirectors, C2 infrastructure and operational security.

Selected findings

Vulnerabilities identified during security research. Most organisations are anonymised; named findings were disclosed through official vulnerability disclosure programs.

DEWR

Department of Employment and Workplace Relations · Official VDP
Broken access control · information disclosure
  • The production API returned the full account list without authentication, including names, emails, ABNs and physical addresses.
  • The pre-production environment allowed open self-registration without Digital ID and granted sessions access to sensitive contact and account APIs.
  • Publicly exposed CIAM API documentation revealed DEWR's identity infrastructure, including invitation, passkey and B2C tenant operations.
  • Affected the Federal Safety Officer Online portal used by accredited users and companies.

Online training provider

IDOR · broken access control · hard-coded AWS keys
7.4M files ~650K users
  • IDOR in the documents API exposed approximately 7.4 million files spanning 2014–2026, including resumes, assessments, voice and video uploads, USI numbers and education records.
  • IDOR in the meeting and communication endpoints leaked user details and allowed arbitrary email sending.
  • Hard-coded AWS keys in client-side JavaScript allowed listing and overwriting compliance documents in S3.
  • Broken access control exposed the entire user base through a list endpoint.
  • Affected users included welfare recipients across two platforms, approximately 650,000 accounts.

DCCEEW

Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water · Official VDP
IDOR · authorization bypass
  • IDOR in the Invoice Payment System allowed any authenticated user to retrieve other customers' invoices by changing a sequential invoice ID.
  • The ownership check could be bypassed by supplying an empty accountNumber parameter.
  • Exposed invoice amounts, payment status, customer reference numbers and PDFs containing company and buyer details.
  • The issue was present in both production and pre-production environments.

Named findings were disclosed through official VDPs. No user data or exploit details are published.

Notes from the field

Write-ups on networking, malware development and offensive security.

Read the blog